This paper studies the effect of fiscal and political decentralization on the death toll by disasters for up to 46 developing and transitional economies from 1974 to 2004. The results show that elected government at the local level does not help mitigate disaster risk. This study underscores the importance of the joint effects of different forms of decentralization and shows that when political decentralization is accompanied by fiscal decentralization, it significantly reduces the number of total dead for the lowest tier of the government. Greater fiscal responsibility is argued to make local elected government more responsive to the vulnerable people.
I. INTRODUCTION
Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) strongly advocates strengthening local government for disaster management 3 . Despite this growing recognition of the role of decentralized government in disaster management, there has been no study to rigorously address this issue.
In this study we investigate the role of political and fiscal decentralization in mitigating disaster risks. While Sen (1984) pointed out long ago the role of democracy and free media in preventing famine, 4 we begin by noting that the impact of decentralization can be isolated effectively using disaster data because: i) disaster is mostly a local phenomenon and the local government can address local issues more effectively, and ii) physical proximity of the government to the people is more crucial in an emergency than in normal periods as it helps the government respond quickly and cost effectively.
By considering both political and fiscal decentralization, we highlight the importance of the combination of the two forms to understand the effectiveness of decentralization. We investigate the effect of fiscal and political decentralization on the death toll by natural disasters from 1974 to 2004 for up to 46 developing and transitional countries. The share of local revenues in total revenue (local and central) is used to measure the extent of the fiscal decentralization. Political decentralization is captured by elected government at the state/provincial and the lowest tier of government. There are four major findings -(i) An elected government at the lowest tier is associated with a higher number of deaths by disasters; the effect of the elected government at state or provincial level is not significant. (ii) The effect of fiscal decentralization is not robust.
(iii) Political decentralization at the lowest level of government is found to improve the disaster outcome in the presence of fiscal decentralization; again for the state or provincial level, this result is not significant. (iv) The above results are more robust for the disasters of hydrometeorological origin (e.g., flood) than that of geological origin (e.g., earthquake).
These findings offer lessons on how to effectively decentralize and to evaluate the impact of past decentralization efforts. Political decentralization alone may not be effective without fiscal decentralization. We argue that greater fiscal responsibility makes local politicians more accountable to their people. Local people gather more information about government's actions when financial issues are involved. Central government also increases monitoring when its transfer to the local governments is large. Moreover, the result indicates that the central government may increase transfers to the regions with more accountable local government with a cleaner image and good reputation in disaster risk mitigation.
There is a large body of cross-country empirical literature investigating the effect of decentralization on a host of economic and governance outcomes. Theoretically, decentralization is argued to increase allocative efficiency and discipline government through greater information and intergovernmental competition. Therefore, greater decentralization is argued to foster growth, improve governance and public service delivery, and reduce the size of the government.
However, the results are mixed and the effect of decentralization is not conclusive 5 . Since we have used data on disasters, we are able to obtain clean insights about the impact of decentralization.
There is also a growing literature that studies the factors that determine the incidence and extent of damage by disasters. This literature primarily studies the role of geography, economic development and quality of institutions. Kellenberg and Mobarak (2007) , Kahn (2005) , Anbarci, et al. (2005) and Skidmore and Toya (2002) showed that richer countries tend to experience less damage and fewer deaths from natural disasters. Democratic government and better quality institutions are also found to reduce the mortality risk of disasters in Kahn (2005) . Anbarci, et al. (2005) argued that in countries with greater income inequality, collective action fails to occur to implement costly investment and regulations for disasters prevention. Using data on earthquake fatalities they show that countries with greater income inequality experience higher death toll.
Our work studying the impact of decentralization is also new to this literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two explores how decentralization can affect disaster outcomes. Section three describes the data used and the estimation techniques.
Section four analyzes the results which include sub-sections on fiscal and political decentralization and their interaction. Section five brings up endogeneity issues while section six checks robustness of the results. Section seven draws conclusion.
II. HOW DOES DECENTRALIZATION AFFECT DISASTER OUTCOME?
According to (FAO, n.d.) the Disaster Management Cycle involves 3 main phases: i) preemergency phase, ii) emergency phase, and iii) post-emergency phase. A decentralized government can be effective in all three phases in disaster management. Messer (2003) argued that since disaster is mostly a local phenomenon, which rarely hits the entire country, use of local information, knowledge and resources are critical for effective prevention measures 6 . These prevention measures in pre-emergency phase typically include riskmapping, application of building code, land zoning, construction of dams, embankments, etc.
Moreover, macroeconomic stabilization, political conflict and other national priorities of central government often overshadow local issues such as disaster risk prevention and preparedness. In such cases, local politicians, who are accountable to their voters, can draw attention of the central government and also raise funds locally and allocate more resources for disaster preparedness.
Intergovernmental competition over mobile factors of production, such as labor and capital can also lead to greater investment in disaster preparedness.
In the emergency phase, which requires immediate and quick response, local government can help mobilize resources very quickly using local knowledge and expertise. Local politicians who want to accumulate political capital have strong incentives to participate in relief and rescue efforts. Rehabilitation and reconstruction in post-emergency phase can also be effectively implemented and coordinated by local government with appropriate assessment of the damage and proper targeting. In short, greater information and accountability, targeting efficiency and cost effectiveness, and competition for mobile factors may lead to efficient disaster risk management by the decentralized government.
The basic argument for decentralization is that it brings government closer to the people so that their preferences are well reflected in public policy making. However, Tanzi (1995) and Prud'homme (1994) argued that too much proximity between the public officials and the local people may breed inefficiency, unprofessionalism, unethical relationship and corruption.
Therefore, when local citizens, particularly the local influential people and local politicians collude with the local bureaucrats, it weakens local government's regulatory and monitoring capacity and this has bearing on the vulnerability risk of disasters. For example, local politicians and elites may engage in land grabbing through deforestation, filling up water-bodies and hill cutting. They may also be involved in allowing risky settlements of loyal voters in vulnerable places (e.g. steep land), and massive land excavation in topographically unstable areas.
Moreover, local politicians and interest groups may become more powerful through greater political decentralization where election outcome does not depend solely on their performance.
As a result, local politicians lack incentives to respond to the needs of the people who are vulnerable to natural disasters. The possibility of 'elite capture', as in Bardhan and Mukharjee (2000) , is higher during both the disaster and post disaster periods when local government receives aid and relief for the affected areas. Stealing and confiscating disaster aid by the local politicians and powerful people is very common in developing countries. Also press, media and civil society, which play a critical role in providing information during disaster, are very weak and vulnerable to political and elite capture at the local level in developing countries.
In these circumstances greater decentralization may not help reduce the loss of disasters.
Therefore, it is an important empirical question if greater decentralization is effective in mitigating disaster risk in developing countries.
III. DATA AND ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE
We use the following regression specification:
The disaster outcome includes number of total dead in a year (t) by natural disasters in a country (i). These data are from the International Disaster Database OFDA/CRED 7 .
We study two types of decentralization -political and fiscal. Disaster risk depends on two components -hazard risks and vulnerability (FAO, n.d.) . Hazard risks typically depend on geographical characteristics of a country as some countries are more disaster-prone than others. We include two geographical variables -elevation and latitude. We run country fixed effects to capture the country-specific geographical, meteorological, as well as social, cultural and institutional factors that are fixed over time and have bearing on disaster risk.
We also include year dummies to capture time variant unobservable such as advancement of knowledge and technological innovation in disaster management. The vulnerability of a country's population primarily depends on the size of population, ability to manage disaster (i.e., income) and population density. Between the two countries with same population size, the country with higher population density is more vulnerable to natural disaster than the sparsely populated one, holding other factors fixed. On the other hand, greater population density also helps disseminate information about disaster quickly and cost-effectively. Therefore, it may also have a beneficial impact.
Moreover, a country's vulnerability also hinges on its socio-political environment. We use the measure of democracy (polity score) and the measure of ethnic fragmentation of Alesina et al. (2003) to control for political aspects which add to the vulnerability risks of the population.
Democratically elected governments are more accountable to the public for service delivery. And media also flourishes under democracy, helping to ensure greater voice and accountability. In ethnically fragmented nations where voters put more weights on ethnic identities than the performance of politicians in public service delivery, local politicians may lack incentives to take adequate measures to minimize disaster risk. Moreover, the central government may not have incentives to internalize the benefits and costs across jurisdictions if the national politicians identify themselves only to certain spatially located groups.
We use a host of estimation techniques, as each has its own strengths and weaknesses. Following the existing literature, we use Generalized Least Squares (GLS) and Negative Binomial (NB).
Both of these methods also allow us to run country and time fixed effects. In case of GLS, we use Ln(1+disaster outcome) as the dependent variable. Moreover, due to the presence of large number of zero observations, we also use Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) model, following Kahn (2005) . However, this estimation technique does not permit us to run country and time fixed effects. We choose Negative Binomial over Poisson because in the latter case mean and standard deviation are equal which is not supported by our data 9 . Table 1 presents results for political decentralization for GLS, NB and ZINB. In basic specification (column 1-3), we use only population density, GDP per capita, log of total population and the frequency of disasters in a year in a country. In the extended specification (column 4-6), we add political and geographical variables. Columns 7 and 8 control for country specific and time varying effects.
IV. ESTIMATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Political Decentralization
<Insert Table 1 here>
Results from columns 1-6 show that there is no consistent pattern in signs for elected state/provincial government (STATE hereafter) and the coefficients are not significant. However, in case of elected government at the lowest level (MUNICIPALITY hereafter), all the coefficients are positive, and statistically significant (except column 4). That is the elected government at the state or provincial level does not have any significant impact on total dead.
But for the lowest level of government, this effect is positive and mostly significant. That is, political decentralization at the lowest tier of government makes the people more vulnerable to disasters. Higher per capita GDP is found to reduce the death count and this effect is highly significant across specifications and estimation techniques. Total number of disaster, as expected, increases the number of total death. There is no consistent pattern in terms of the signs of democracy index and almost all specification the coefficients are not statistically significant.
Interestingly an increase in population density of a country reduces the death toll. Besley and Burgess (2002) found that greater population density also helps disseminate information about disaster quickly and cost-effectively and thus helps mitigates disaster risk. For ethnic fragmentation the signs are negative, with significant negative effects for NB and ZINB 10 . The signs of both latitude and elevation are positive. Interestingly, a country with higher elevation and latitude is found to experience higher death toll from disaster and this effect is highly significant.
The last two columns of Table 1 present the results for GLS and NB with country and year fixed effects for full specification only. Again, the effects of STATE, even though the signs are negative, are not statistically significant. However, political decentralization at the lowest level of government is found to be associated with higher total death as the signs of MUNICIPALITY are all positive and significant in both cases. The signs for other controls are similar to columns 1-6 in Table 1 .
From Table 1 , we can conclude that only significant and robust impact of political decentralization is found at the lowest tier of government. It sheds light on the fact that the impact of disaster is generally limited to only small areas and because of physical proximity, only the lowest tier of government can have significant impact on the disaster outcome. The result also indicates that in developing countries lower tiers of local government are more vulnerable to corruption and 'elite capture', and thus are more irresponsive and irresponsible than the upper levels such as state or provincial governments. Election outcome at the lowest tier may depend less on the politician's role in providing local public goods since the possibility of 'capture' of the political process is higher at this level. Moreover, the opportunity for upward mobility in a political career is lower for the politicians at the bottom and thus they have less incentive to deliver. there is no pattern in signs and most of the coefficients are not statistically significant. When we control for country and year fixed effects (column 7-8), the signs are negative but not significant.
Fiscal Decentralization
The result indicates that fiscal decentralization alone has no robust impact on reducing death toll.
<Insert Table 2 here>
Interaction between Political and Fiscal Decentralization.
It is argued that the effectiveness of local government depends on how different forms of decentralization interact with each other. Citing several cases of 'mismatch' among political, fiscal and administrative decentralization in developing countries, Ahmad et al. (2005) note that lack of balance in different forms may weaken the efficacy of public service delivery of decentralized government. Riker (1964) also argues that locally elected government and strong political party at the top improves the outcome of fiscal decentralization. The argument is that an elected government at the local level ensures accountability and a strong national political party provides incentives for upward career mobility for the local politicians. Following Riker's (1964) , Enikopolov and Zhuravskaya (2007) tested these hypotheses for various measures of governance, basic public service delivery and long run growth and found evidence in support of them. Table 3 shows the results for interactions for total death toll. In case of STATE the signs of the interaction terms between sub-national revenue and STATE are all positive but insignificant and the pattern remain the same when we control for country and year fixed effects. In case of MUNICIPALITY, the signs of the interaction terms between MUNICIPALITY and revenue are all negative and highly significant in all specifications. The individual effects of MUNICIPALITY are positive and significant as well. Even though STATE has negative and significant impact in the first three columns, the effect disappears once controlled for country and year fixed effects. The same is also true for the coefficient of sub-national revenue.
These results imply that fiscal decentralization with elected government at the lowest level reduces the number of total dead. But in the case of elected government at the state level the effect of fiscal decentralization is not significant.
<Insert Table 3 here>
The results shed light on the fact that accountability and responsiveness of the lower level of government may depend on the expenditure and financing responsibilities. Local governments in the developing countries are not self-sufficient and the transfer of funds from the central government constitutes a large portion of their budget. Ahmad et al. (2005) argue that central government's transfer to local government has two parts-conditional and unconditional. While the former ensures accountability to the central, the latter leads to accountability to the local people. The results indicate that fiscal responsibility makes local politicians accountable both to the central government and to the local electorate and helps manage disaster better.
We also test if Riker's other hypotheses hold -whether a strong national party provides enough incentives for local politicians to perform. Using the same two variables (age of government and opposition parties and fractionalization of government) to capture national party strength (and lack thereof) and the same proxies for the political institution variables as Enikolopov and
Zhuravskaya (2007), we did not find support for this hypothesis (Table 4) . One reason could be that fiscal decentralization fails to distinguish between different tiers of government as the effect may vary with the number of tiers. More specifically, the interaction terms between sub-national revenue and party age and sub-national revenue and government fractionalization may not distinguish the effects of different tiers.
<Insert Table 4 here>
V. ENDOGENEITY ISSUES
One can argue that there is an omitted variable bias -some unobservables may affect both the decentralization decision and the disaster outcomes. Note that we have already controlled for country and year specific effects. One weak candidate is time-varying and country-specific institutional factors which may have impact on both decentralization and disaster management 11 .
Another possibility is simultaneity bias -decentralization decision is influenced by disaster risk mitigation strategy. Though at present multilateral donors are strongly advocating the decentralization agenda to include in disaster risk mitigation strategy, it is very unlikely that governments of developing countries are becoming more decentralized in order to mitigate disaster risks. In developing countries the major forces that lead to decentralization include collapse of centralized economies in Eastern Europe, transition to strong democracy (Latin America), and response to ethnic conflicts in Africa (Ahmad et al, 2005 and NB with year and country fixed effects in Table 6 and 7 for total deaths. It is interesting that the effects of political and fiscal decentralization are qualitatively similar to previous results in section 4 -disaster risk increases with elected government at the lowest tier but it decreases when elected government is accompanied by greater fiscal decentralization. The results are found to be significant and robust for the disasters with hydro-meteorological origin. For the disasters with geological origin the signs are similar but insignificant. It indicates that resource poor local governments are more efficient in managing disasters which strike slowly, lack suddenness and occur recurrently 16 .
<Insert Table 6 and 7 here>
We also used an alternative dependent variable -total number of people affected ( 7. See Table A4 for the description of variables used in regressions.
8. The correlation between share of revenue and expenditure is very high (0.8) for our sample. We focus primarily on sub national revenue here.
9. Mean and standard deviation for total death are 472 and 6146 respectively. See descriptive statistics (Table A3 ).
10. Kahn (2005) also found similar result. Note that the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial regression also produces result for Logit model which estimates the probability of no death (and no affected) in a year for a country. Since we are not interested in incidence of the disaster outcomes, these results are not reported here. However, these results are available upon request.
11. Fisman and Gatti (2002) argued that inefficient and corrupt government officials can influence the decentralization decision and deteriorates mortality risks of disaster.
However, these unobservables can be argued to be fixed over time in developing countries and therefore are taken care of by country fixed effects.
12. Acemoglu (2005) 14. We also included income inequality in the right hand side. Our findings are robust to inclusion of this variable.
15. In order to save space, we didn't report these results. These results are available upon request.
16. In our sample, 66 percent of hydro-meteorological disasters are floods and composition of geological disasters is: earthquake (48%), landslide (34%), and extreme temperature (18%).
17. There are a large number of cases where total number of affected people and damage are zero/missing when total number of people killed is positive, which is very unlikely. On the other hand, data on death count is much reliable and cleaner. Since this variable is less reliable, we focused our analysis with the dependent variable Total Dead. Average of ages of the first government party, second government party, and first opposition party, or the subset of these for which party age is known. Source: Beck et al., 2001 . Parliamentary System Systems with unelected executives get a 0. Systems with presidents who are elected directly or by an electoral college, in cases where there is no prime minister also receive a 0. Source: Beck et al., 2001 . Government Fractionalization The probability that two members of parliament picked at random from among the government parties will be of different parties. 
